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The main goal of this paper is to examine the implications of ﬁrm-oriented ﬁscal poli-
cies, such as capital subsidies and tax allowances, in an economy with an underground
sector. In addition, we investigate whether the technology structure of “hidden” produc-
tion may facilitate or counteract the eﬀects of ﬁscal policies on ﬁrm behavior. Among
our results we stress the following: ﬁrst, capital subsidies promote tax evasion; these
subsidies induce ﬁrms to increase actual capital accumulation (a level eﬀect), but also
produce a reduction in the regular share of aggregate capital stock (a composition eﬀect).
Second, tax relief reduces underground activities and fosters capital accumulation, as
well as aggregate production. Third, the technology structure matters for determining
how to allocate resources between formal and informal production, hence the amount of
reported revenues.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper focuses on the nexus among selected ﬁrm-oriented ﬁscal policies (tax relief and
capital subsidies), physical capital accumulation and underground activities. In particular,
we examine the implications of ﬁscal policies aimed to support ﬁrms, such as capital subsidies
and tax allowances, in the presence of an underground economy. In addition, we investigate
whether the technology structure of “hidden” production may facilitate or counteract the
eﬀects (the eﬀectiveness) of the ﬁscal policies on ﬁrm behavior.
Subsidies programmes and tax advantages for "infant" industries or depressed areas are
often justiﬁed because the industry is not competitive enough and prices do not show full
ﬂexibility. However, granting capital subsidies and tax allowances to ﬁrms has also important
implications for underground activities and tax evasion.
Underground activities occur in many countries, and there are signiﬁcant indications that
this phenomenon is large and increasing.1 The estimated average size of the underground
sector, as a percentage of total GDP, in the late 1990s was about 17 percent in OECD
countries (Schneider and Enste, 2002).2
The paper presents an optimal-investment model in which a representative ﬁrm max-
imizes the expected cash ﬂow, choosing simultaneously the optimal combination of capi-
tal stock (i.e. ﬁrm size) and its allocation between two possible technologies -regular and
irregular-, conditional on a set of ﬁscal policy and technological parameters.
We are not aware of any contribution investigating how the optimal investment choice is
related to underground economy and tax evasion. This is a major issue, because underground
activities represent an additional ﬁnancing source for investing, which is not subject to
distortionary taxation. This means that ﬁscal policy results might diﬀer from what we
expect in a model that explicitly incorporates tax evasion. It is important to understand
from a theoretical perspective the economic mechanisms operating in such a context.
We focus on the moonlighting ﬁrm, which operates simultaneously in the regular and
irregular sectors, using the same stock of capital and evading taxation in the irregular sector.
Such a ﬁrm is able to evade, like ﬁrms that operate only in the underground economy, but in
addition, it can exploit a technological advantage. The paper explicitly considers two ﬁscal
1There is no universal agreement on what deﬁnes the underground economy. Moreover, the diﬃculty in
deﬁning the sector extends to the estimation of its size. We are concerned with the size of the underground
economy as encompassing activities which are otherwise legal but go unreported or unrecorded.
2Estimates of the underground economy are particularly diﬃcult, as the phenomenon is, by deﬁnition, not
directly measurable. Several methods have been used for this purpose, some based on theoretical models,
some based on econometrics and others on micro analysis of agent responses in particular surveys. See,
among others, The Economic Journal (1999) symposium on the Hidden Economy, and Busato, Chiarini and
Di Maro (2006).
2policy experiments: we study the impact of permanent changes in tax rates and investment
subsidies both on capital accumulation, and on its allocation across regular and underground
production.
Our analysis focuses on the Italian economy due to the sizeable underground sector
in Italy, and the high percentage of “moonlighters” which operate in the informal sector.3
Furthermore, Italian governments have repeatedly supported ﬁrms with capital subsidies and
tax allowances. We think that the theoretical scheme and its predictions may be applied,
without loss of generality, to other countries.
Three main results can be drawn from our analysis. First, capital subsidies promote
tax evasion; subsidies induce ﬁrms to increase actual capital accumulation (a level eﬀect),
but also produce a reduction in the regular share of aggregate capital stock (a composition
eﬀect). The investment subsidy is a non excludable public good that opens room for free-
riding (tax evasion in other words). In this context the Government is not capable, because
of (un-modeled) monitoring costs, to distinguish between regular and moonlighting ﬁrms.
Firms therefore, have an incentive to declare a suﬃciently small amount of revenues to be
eligible for the subsidy, while investing relatively more in the underground economy and
"pocketing the tax wedge". Second, a tax reduction reduces underground activities and
foster capital accumulation and aggregate production. This is not a novelty, but we draw
interesting insights which may not follow directly from intuition when tax reliefs are related
to ﬁrms’ technology. Indeed, the third main result of our analysis asserts that technology
matters (the labelled moonlighting eﬀect and scale eﬀect, discussed below) for determining
how to allocate resources between the formal and informal production, hence the amount of
reported revenues.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts and
deﬁnes the motivations of the paper. Section 3 explains the ﬁrm maximizing problem and
characterizes the long run equilibrium. In Sections 4 and 5 the main results of technology
and policy analysis are reported and commented upon. Finally, Section 6 presents some
concluding remarks.
2 Fiscal Policies and Underground Activities in Europe: Se-
lected Stylized Facts
The question of the relationship between taxation and the underground economy has received
considerable attention, but we are not aware of economists or politicians who have considered
3In Italy, the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) produces several time series estimates of the under-
ground economy and employment, disaggregated at regional level since 1995.
3Table 1: Selected key indicators of State aid and tax rates, selected EU countries, 2004
Aid ES DE FR IT BE UK GR SE
% of the overall EU-25 amount 6.5 28.0 14.5 11.4 1.6 8.8 0.8 4.5
%o fG D P 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 - 0.8
Eﬀective corporate tax burden 36.1 36.0 34.8 32.0 29.7 28.9 28.0 24.8
Spain:ES; Germany:DE; France:FR; Italy:IT; Belgium:BE; United Kingdom:UK; Greece:GR; Sweden:SE.
Source: European Commission (2006); ZEW (2006).
the eﬀects of capital subsidies on tax evasion and underground production.
A sustained expansion of public sector expenditures on welfare provision has led Euro-
pean ﬁrms to endure high corporate tax rates (see the last row of Table 1 and Joumard,
2002). Many European governments, to stimulate demand for labor and promote capital
accumulation in particular areas of the country or productive sector, have recently shifted
the tax burden on capital away from such target ares, introducing generous tax relief policies
for investment expenditure or raising tax allowances to oﬀset corporate income tax. The
rationale of these interventions, and in general of so-called State aid, is to address various
market failures (externalities, merit or public goods and so on) or they may be justiﬁed
using equity arguments, to improve social and regional cohesion, in order, for instance, to
promote growth. European Union (EU) State aid policy is strictly regulated since it may
harm competition. To this end, the European Commission Treaty (Art. 87) obliges EU
governments to negotiate their allowances with the European Commission.
According to the European Commission (2006), in 2004 the most of the EU-25 member
States’ aid was earmarked for the manufacturing sector (59%) while a further 23% was
directed towards agriculture. Overall, EU-25 State aid accounted, in 2004, for more than
61.4 billion euros. Table 1 presents some ﬁgures on State aid and tax rates; in particular,
the size of total aid in each country is shown as a percentage of its own GDP, ans as a
percentage of the overall EU-25 amount of State aid.
There are several instruments of State aid (see Nitsche and Heidhues, 2006 and European
Commission, 2006) . Grants and Tax Exemptions and Equity Participation comprise aid
that is transferred in full to the recipient and accounts for the vast majority of aid in all
Member States. Soft Loans and Tax Deferrals cover transfers in which the aid element is
the interest saved by the recipient during the period in which the capital transferred is at
his/her disposal. Guarantees, expressed in nominal amounts guaranteed, incorporate aid
elements corresponding to the beneﬁtw h i c ht h er e c i p i e n tr e c e i v e sf r e eo fc h a r g eo ra tl o w e r
than the market rate. The share of each aid instrument in total aid to manufacturing and
4Table 2: Distribution of aid by instruments, selected EU countries, 2002-2004
ES DE FR IT BE UK GR SE
Grants 59.9 40.3 51.6 66.9 88.6 55.6 66.4 33.7
Tax exemption 29.2 39.3 30.6 9.7 3.4 32.4 33.6 63.4
Equity participation 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.6
Soft Loans 10.6 1.2 15.3 3.9 6.1 10.8 0.0 2.2
Tax deferrals 0.0 0.0 0.1 18.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guarantees 0.0 17.4 2.3 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Spain:ES; Germany:DE; France:FR; Italy:IT; Belgium:BE; United Kingdom:UK; Greece:GR; Sweden:SE.
Source: European Commission (2006).
services sectors for some selected countries is reported in Table 2.4
State aid accounts for a considerable share of the GDP in EU countries; moreover,
countries with high corporate taxation, such as Germany, France and Italy, also provide
large amounts of total EU State aid. This evidence suggests that there could be as yet
unexplored connections among State aid policies, tax policy and the underground economy.
Some insights into the size of the underground economy in EU countries are given in the
Flynn Report (European Commission, 1998), which estimated that unoﬃcial production of
goods and services in European countries ranged between 7 and 16% of total GDP, with
considerable diﬀerences among States. Although underground economy estimates strongly
depend upon the estimation method used, the Flynn report suggested the existence of three
diﬀerent groups of countries. First, the Scandinavian countries, which, along with Ireland
and Austria, had the lowest share of the underground economy, about 5% of GDP. By
contrast, the largest shares of informal activities were recorded in southern countries, in
particular Italy and Greece, with a size of about 20% of GDP, followed by Belgium and
Spain, with slightly lower ﬁgures . Finally, a third group of countries, UK, Germany and
France displayed intermediate size of shadow activities compared to the ﬁrst two groups.
More recent ﬁgures seem to conﬁrm this ranking of countries (Schneider and Enste, 2002).
While the justiﬁcation for State aid policies have often been discussed, and their ex-ante
eﬀects have (albeit much less) been investigated, their implications in contexts characterized
by the presence and the persistent nature of the informal economy are entirely neglected.
The paper discusses possible interactions between State aid, and in particular tax ad-
4The aid schemes directed to the manufacturing/services sectors have been broken down according to their
objective into two main categories: i) Horizontal objectives (R&D; Environment; Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises -SMEs; Commerce; Employment; Regional aid); ii) Sector Aid (Manufacturing; Services; Coal
mining; Other non-manufacturing; Transport). State aid for horizontal objectives amounted to 76% of total
aid in 2004; moreover, among the above listed categories of horizontal objectives, regional aid and SMEs aid
played a major role.
5vantages and capital subsidies, in the presence of tax evasion and an underground economy,
focusing on the productive activity of ﬁrms operating simultaneously in both the oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial sector.
3 The Model
We assume a simple model with homogeneous good that can be produced using two diﬀerent
technologies, the regular technology and the underground one; regular production is taxed
while underground production is not declared to the ﬁscal authorities.
The deﬁnition of irregular production needs some speciﬁcation. Denote with K the ﬁrm’s
capital stock, and with μ and (1 − μ) respectively, the share of capital allocated to the regular
and irregular sector. Following an imaginative but incisive classiﬁcation (e.g. Cowell, 1990),
irregular production can be undertaken either by a completely irregular ﬁrm (hereinafter
deﬁned as a ghost ﬁrm), or by a ﬁrm which acts only partially in the underground sector
(hereinafter deﬁned as a moonlighting ﬁrm). Capital accumulation and allocating decisions
would be diﬀerent in the two cases: the share of capital invested in the regular sector would
be μ =0for a ghost ﬁrm, while it belongs in μ ∈ (0,1) for a moonlighting ﬁrm. Dealing
with a ghost ﬁrm means considering that all the production is hidden. In this paper we
consider a representative ﬁrm which operates “above” as well as “under” ground, producing
an identical homogeneous good and using a unique stock of capital, but declaring to the
ﬁscal authorities only a share of its production.
The literature usually assumes that underground ﬁrms are ghost ﬁrms and therefore less
productive than regular ﬁrms. Typical explanations include lower entrepreneurial ability,
diﬃculty in getting ﬁnancial support and high transaction costs due to the necessity to
locate “trustworthy” trading partners.5 “Moonlighting technology” may relax the limits
usually assessed for underground ﬁrms, generating a speciﬁc externality, which cannot be
exploited by ghost ﬁrms.6
To have an idea of the signiﬁcance of moonlighter behavior in underground activities,
we refer to a recent work by Hibbs and Piculescu (2006) and a survey by Censis (2005).
Hibbs and Piculescu, using data from the World Bank, point out that more than 60% of
3,818 interviewed enterprises, distributed over 54 countries, are used to operating both in the
5See Anderberg et al. (2003); Loayza (1994).
6The moonlighter may undertake irregular activities to obtain one of the following alternatives: (a) “extra-
proﬁt ”: this is the situation of medium size productive units, largely regular, with their own brand, which
exploit underground production to gain extra proﬁts (but also the partial decentralization by a regular ﬁrm
toward smaller and irregular productive units referred to as “local underground districts”; (b) “surviving
”: this situation applies to small ﬁrms producing largely underground, which use regular production as a
convenient screen to avoid ﬁscal controls. For greater details for Italy see Lucifora (2003) and Roma (2001).
6Table 3: Sales amount reported by a typical ﬁrm for tax purposes (percent), main World
regions, 1999-2000
Regions tax compliance tax evasion
East Asia & Paciﬁc 70.54 29.46
Europe & Central Asia 89.35 20.65
Latin America & Caribbean 75.11 24.89
Middle East & North Africa 75.13 24.87
OECD 93.55 6.45
South Asia 93.7 6.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 78.62 21.38
Source: World Bank.
Table 4: Irregular ﬁrms as a percentage of total ﬁrms, main Italian regions, 2005
Irregular Firms North-West North-East Center South Italy
Ghost Firms (1) 5.8 4.9 6.8 16.8 9.7
Moonlighting Firms (2) 29.7 31.3 41.7 59.9 43.4
Total Irregular Firms (1+2) 35.5 36.2 48.5 76.7 53.1
Source: Authors’ elaboration upon Censis (2005).
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial sector. The phenomenon is indirectly estimated by the World Bank’s
World Business Environment Surveys (WBES) through the average percentage of total sales
that ﬁrms report for tax purposes. This evidence is shown in Table 3 for the main World
regions. Since all respondents are legally registered ﬁrms, the high percentage of tax evasion,
deﬁned as the full sales minus the percentage of tax compliance with ﬁscal law, suggests that
the representative ﬁrm is often a moonlighter.
More detailed data are available for Italy. A recent survey by Censis (2005), whose main
evidence is shown in Table 4, highlights that most of the Italian ﬁrms which operate in the
underground economy are moonlighters, while ghost ﬁrms are a residual share of the total
ﬁrms.7
These remarks suggest that partial tax evasion (moonlighting technology) may oﬀer
some additional convenience to irregular entrepreneurs compared to total tax evasion (ghost
technology).
7The survey conducted by the World Bank (2000) estimates the informal economy by asking managers the
question "Recognizing the diﬃculties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations,
what percentage of total sales you estimate the typical ﬁrm in your are of activity reports for tax purposes?".
The survey carried out by Censis (Centre for Social Studies and Policies) is based on qualitative method-
ology, namely interviewing selected witnesses (managers, union representatives, public oﬃcers and so on).
73.1 Technology under Tax Evasion
Each ﬁrm can decide to implement regular production (no tax evasion), underground pro-
duction (ghost ﬁrm) or both (moonlighting ﬁrm). Let μ or (1 − μ) denote the share of capital
(K) allocated to the regular or underground sector. Hence the output of the two specialized
ﬁrms, i.e. regular and ghost is respectively:8
YR = A(μK)a,μ=1 ,0 <a<1
YU = B ((1 − μ)K))
a ,μ=0 ,0 <a<1,
where a represents the elasticity of capital stocks in the two sectors. The two sectors use
identical technologies with the exception of the two scaling factors A and B.A so c c u r si na
two-sector model with sector speciﬁce x t e r n a l i t i e s ,w ea s s u m et h a tf r o mt h ep e r s p e c t i v eo fa
ﬁrm operating in a single sector, the two parameters are taken as positive constants, while
for a ﬁrm operating simultaneously in the two sectors (moonlighting) B is a function of the
total use of capital:9
B = Kaσ.
The parameter σ measures the size of the external eﬀect internalized by the simultaneous
implementation of the regular and underground technology. Indeed, ﬁrms which have a reg-
ularly registered/declared activity can exploit, during their “irregular production”, a broad
series of indirect beneﬁts, stemming from regular production, and not available for ghost
ﬁrms, such as: a more extensive, high-qualiﬁed network of suppliers and/or customers; the
possibility of using several ﬁscal policy beneﬁts, such as the ﬁscal allowances for investment;
the possibility of accessing the market of bank loans and so on.10 In the rest of the paper
we refer to this as the moonlighting eﬀect. Condition 1 below suggests that the size of the
externality should be suﬃciently low as to ensure that returns to scale are not increasing at
the ﬁrm level:
8To simplify the analysis we are considering a single factor technology which employs only capital; this
is tantamount to a constant returns of scale technology, with capital and labor inputs: in this case, output
as well as capital would be measured per unit of employee. Moreover, since both sectors produce the same
commodity, the capital elasticities are assumed to be identical.
9In a diﬀerent context (real business cycle model with indeterminacy) Benhabib and Farmer (1996) used
a similar formulation to represent aggregate capital and labour external eﬀects in a two-sector model. Of
course, we rule out any kind of indeterminacy, as Condition 1 and Proposition 2 below demonstrate.
10Thus, we are emphasizing the technology of this partial tax evader against a total tax evader ﬁrm. The
l a t t e ri sl e s se ﬃcient given that its technology wastes the advantages of the external eﬀect σ.S i n c ew ea r e
only interested in examining tax evasion, we do not consider regular ﬁrms in our analysis.
8Condition 1 0 <σ<1−a
a .
The restriction on the size of the moonlighting eﬀect σ and, consequently, the exclusion
of any sort of increasing returns of scale, is a necessary assumption to allow the moonlighting
ﬁrm to choose a ﬁnite optimal size of capital dimension, capturing the positive interaction
between regular and underground production.11
Given these assumptions, total production value is computed by linearly aggregating
regular and underground produced outputs. Incorporating the external eﬀect B, total pro-
duction reads:
Y = YR + YU = A(μK)a +( 1− μ)aKa(1+σ). (1)
The ﬁrm behaves as a partial tax-evader, because it complies with ﬁscal law only for
regular production.12
The institutional side of the model is deﬁned by the triple {ρ,τ,s},w h e r eτ deﬁnes a
proportional tax rate levied on output, s represents a surcharge factor (s>1) levied on the
tax rate if a ﬁrm is detected evading; ﬁnally, ρ is the probability that a ﬁrm is detected and
convicted of tax evasion.
The ﬁrm’s revenues may be expressed as follows:
REV → Detected
(∼ρ)




REVND =( 1− τ)YR + YU
and the expected revenues, under risk neutrality, are:
E(R)=E(ρ)REVD + E (1 − ρ)REVND = (2)
=( 1 − τ)YR +( 1− ρτs)YU.
It can be shown that the following condition ensures the existence of both productions:
Condition 2 s>1 and ρs < (1 − ρ).
11In the appendix it is shown that a suﬃcient condition to allow saddle path stability is: σ<(a − 1)
2 /a <
(1 − a)/a.
12The pre-tax technology implies that the regular/underground production ratio is a decreasing function of
the total amount of capital, reﬂecting endogenous total factor productivity in the evaded production. After
considering tax enforcement parameters, this negative relationship no longer applies, as the results shown in
Sections 5 and 6 demonstrate.
9Condition 2 states that the surcharge must be higher than unity, and that the expected
surcharge must be lower than the threshold (1 − ρ). Otherwise the expected return to a
unit of evaded production, (1 − ρ)τ − ρτs, would be negative, such that it would not be
worthwhile for the ﬁrm to operate in the underground sector.13
3.2 Value of the Firm
At time zero the ﬁrm is endowed with a given positive amount of capital
¡ ¯ K0
¢
,a n dw i t ha n
intertemporally ﬁxed ﬂow of a non-capital resource (labor, land), which are normalized to
unity.
Each instant a ﬁrm maximizes the intertemporal cash-ﬂow function, choosing how many
resources to allocate to the regular production, μ, and how much revenue to invest, I.
Investing is a costly process for ﬁrms; the assumption here adopted is that the adjustment
costs are a convex function of the rate of change of the capital stock (no learning by doing):
C(I)=Ib;b>1.
In addition, we assume that investments are encouraged by the government, which pro-
vides a capital contribution proportional to total investment, α,t oﬁrms which are willing
to increase their capital stock. We assume that government is neither able to know whether
new capital will be employed in regular or irregular production, nor has accountability tools
at its disposal enforcing the ﬁrm to declare only the capital regularly employed.14
The value of the ﬁrm is the expected present value of its revenues net of expenditures
on capital input. The representative ﬁrm maximizes expected cash ﬂow V subject to a
constraint set:
13In this paper we use a simple tax evasion model. There are many issues, concerning the penalty rate, the
possibility of detection and audit, that we cannot discuss here. See among others, the survey of Andreoni,
Erald and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Bayer (2006) and Sandmo (2006). Both empirical
and theoretical literature usually considers taxation and regulation as the main causes of the existence of the
underground sector (see Thomas, 1992; Tanzi, 1980; Dallago,1990). Analysis of tax evasion, starting from
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), focuses on the structure of marginal taxation, and/or the
consequences for private/social welfare, without investigating the link between tax evasion and technology
(see Cowell, 1990; Trandel and Snow, 1999, for surveys on tax evasion, and Alm, 1985 for the welfare eﬀects
of evasion). On the other hand, when focusing on the technology of underground activities, the literature
very often concentrates on the labor input, neglecting capital utilization (see Portes, Castells and Benton,
1989; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Busato and Chiarini, 2004; Busato, Chiarini and Rey, 2005).
14This assumption along with Condition 2 in the main text is a strong incentive toward underground
production. A diﬀerent situation would occur if the ﬁscal authorities were more eﬀective in allowing incentives
to capital than in detecting tax evasion. In this case the rational agent would choose to produce irregularly,
YU > 0, but seek incentives only on the regular share of its investment, αμI. T h i sh y p o t h e s i sc o m p l i c a t e s







s.to : Π =( 1− τ)A(μK)a +( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ)aKa(1+σ) − I − Ib + αI
: ˙ K = I − δK (4)
:0≤ μ ≤ 1








The quantity (1 −τ)A(μK)a +( 1− ρτs)(1 −μ)aKa(1+σ) represents ﬁrm’s expected rev-
enues, net of taxation, I i st h ea m o u n to fg r o s si n v e s t m e n t ,a n dδ is the physical depreciation
rate of capital. The amount αI denotes an investment allowance, where α belongs to the
(0,1) interval. This amount could account for several diﬀerent types of State aid described in
Section 2,s u c ha sg r a n t st oﬁrms investing in less developed areas (regional aid), ﬁnancial
facilities to Small and Medium-sized Enterprisers (SME aid), ﬁnancial facilities for speciﬁc
sectors (sector aid).






(1 − τ)A(μK)a +( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ)aKa(1+σ) + αI+
−I − Ib + φ0 (I − δK)+φ1μ − φ2(μ − 1)
)
dt,
where r is the exogenous discount rate.
The ﬁrst order conditions obtain:15










=0:α − 1 − bIb−1 + φ0 =0 (7)
∂H
∂μ




= ˙ φ0 − rφ0 : (9)
˙ φ0 = rφ0 −
h
(1 − τ)aAμaKa−1 +( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ)aa(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1 − φ0δ
i
μ ≥ 0;φ1 ≥ 0 (10)
−μ ≥ 1;φ2 ≥ 0 (11)
˙ K = I − δK. (12)
Proposition 1 below proves that the model has an interior solution.
Proposition 1 Fof ﬁrms with moonlighting technology it is not worth either becoming com-
pletely regular (μ =1 )nor turning into a ghost ﬁrm (μ =0 ) : i.e. the model does not admit
corner solutions.
Proof. μ as well as (1 − μ) are the basis of a negative power in Eq. 8, such that to
have a ﬁnite solution they must necessarily lie in the open interval (0,1).
Manipulation of the ﬁrst order conditions leads to the following conditions characterizing
optimal capital accumulation and tax evasion:
[(φ0 − 1+α)/b]
1/(b−1) = I (13)
(1 − τ)aAμa−1Ka − (1 − ρτs)a(1 − μ)a−1Ka(1+σ) =0 (14)
˙ φ0 =( r + δ)φ0 − (1 − τ)aAμaKa−1 − (1 − ρτs)(1 − μ)aa(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1 (15)
˙ K = I − δK. (16)
The investment function (Eq. 13) has standard characteristics: for a given level of
ﬁscal allowances, α, investment is increasing in φ0, and gross investment is zero when the
marginal value of capital is just equal to the market price of capital, normalized to 1,n e to f
ﬁscal allowance. The allowance of ﬁscal incentives to capital accumulation clearly increases
investment.
Eq. 14 ensures the optimal allocation of capital between regular and underground
production: the marginal eﬀect of a capital reallocation on the net-of-tax revenues in the
two sectors must be equal.
12Combining the investment function with Eq. 16, we obtain a dynamic system such that:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
˙ φ0 =( r + δ)φ0 − (1 − τ)aA(μ)
a Ka−1 − (1 − ρτs)[1− μ]
a a(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1



















The ﬁrst condition states that the marginal revenue of capital equals its user cost,(r + δ)φ0−
˙ φ0; the second condition implies that K is increasing when φ0 is so much higher than the
marginal cost of capital, 1 − α, as to achieve a level of net investment larger than physi-
cal depreciation of capital, δK. Finally, the third equation deﬁnes the equilibrium level of
regular capital as a negative function of the total capital.16
3.3 The Steady State
3.3.1 Qualitative Analysis
The Steady state (˙ φ0 = ˙ K =0 ) is characterized by the three equations:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨

























The ﬁrst equation suggests that in equilibrium (long run) the shadow price of capital is
the discounted value of the net-of-tax marginal productivity of capital; the second condition
states that the stock of capital is stable when investment is just equal to physical depre-
ciation of capital; ﬁnally, the last relation expresses the optimal allocation of the capital
stock between regular and underground production. It should be stressed that the long run
equilibrium can only be described in a three-dimension space, and given the non-linearity of
the involved relationships, we are compelled to use calibration to describe the nature of the
steady state.
Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamic system of Eq. 17 admits a unique steady
state.
Proof. APPENDIX
16The negative relation expressed by the μ(K) equation in System 17 is a consequence of the endogenous
TFP in underground technology.
13Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamic system of Eq. 17 is always a saddle path.
Proof. APPENDIX
3.3.2 Model Calibration
The model depends on ﬁve parameters. We calibrate these parameters for Italy, a country
with a considerable size of hidden activities and high tax evasion. Moreover, as stressed
earlyer in this paper, underground activities are characterized by high percentage of moon-
lighting ﬁrms, and the Governments in this economy have repeatedly supported ﬁrms with
capital subsidies and tax allowances.17
The capital elasticity a, consistent with the standard literature, is set at the value 0.3;
the exogenous discount rate, r, set at 0.025; the rate of physical depreciation of capital, δ,
calibrated to 0.125. The technological parameters A and σ, are set, respectively tat 10 and
0.5. The latter, the moonlighting eﬀect, must be consistent with Condition 1, deﬁned above,
and with the Appendix where we outline the model conditions to achieve a saddle path.
With regard to parameter A, it represents the scale of production in regular technology and
more details will be provided below.
Next, the tax rate, τ, is set at 0.4 to match the average high level of corporate taxation
in Italy in recent years; the surcharge applied to tax evaders, s, following Italian civil law,
is set at 1.3; the probability of being caught when cheating the government, ρ,i ss e ta ta
very low value, 0.05, to give an idea of low enforcement, which can be assimilated to Italian
actual conditions; ﬁnally, the size of incentives to capital accumulation, α, is set at 14% in
the baseline calibration.18
Model Calibration: the benchmark
αA τ σ r ρs a δ
0.14 10 0.40 0.50 .025 0.05 1.30 .30 .125
Given this set of parameters, the solution of the dynamic system identiﬁes a single long
run equilibrium, given by the equilibrium vector:
(K∗ =1 5 .5242;φ∗
0 =2 .0354;μ∗ =0 .8818).
17For the size of the underground economy, see, Baldassarini and Pascarella (2003), Schneider and Enste
(2002), and Busato, Chiarini and Di Maro (2006). An outline of the State aid to ﬁrms in Italy may be found
in Bosco (2002) and Ministero delle Attività Produttive (2005).
18Calibration of the ﬁscal parameters τ and α was chosen starting from the recent analysis of the Italian
ﬁrm ﬁscal regimes addressed in Bontempi et al. (2001). In particular, incentives to investment identiﬁed as
Credito di Imposta ranges from an average level of 0.14 for the Center-North regions, to 0.65 for the least
developed region (Calabria). As for corporate taxation, the ﬁgure reported in KPMG (2004) for Italy is
37.25%. See also Busato and Chiarini (2004) for calibration of a macroeconomic model with tax evasion.
143.3.3 Steady State Relations (K,φ0) and (μ,K)
The three steady state relations expressed by System 18 can be geometrically represented
in the space (K,φ0,μ). In order to provide more insights into the local dynamics around the
steady state, we prefer to represent them in two bi-dimensional graphs as in Figure 1.19
The left panel of the Figure displays the two steady state relations ˙ φ0 =0(the shadow price
of capital) and ˙ K =0(the stock of capital), while in the right panel the locus depicts the
share of capital allocated in the regular sector, μ(K).
For our parametrization, the ﬁrst equation of System 18 describes a convex and neg-
atively shaped curve: a larger amount of capital reduces its marginal productivity, so that
in equilibrium a lower value for the shadow price for capital is commanded (see the ˙ φ0 =0
locus in the left panel of Figure 1). The locus ˙ K =0(see the left panel of Figure 1)i s
displayed as an increasing relationship in the space (K,φ0), consistently with the standard
literature on the investment function; as investment must be equal to the depreciation in
the capital stock, then, in order to maintain a higher stock of capital a higher shadow price
is required.
The right-hand panel in Figure 1 represents, in the space (μ,K), the relationship be-
tween the regular share of capital μ and the total stock of capital (K),d e ﬁn e db yt h el a s t
equation of System 18:f o re a c hl e v e lo fK identiﬁed by the solution of System 18,a
unique cash-ﬂow maximizing value of μ is identiﬁed. The locus μ(K) is monotone and de-
creasing: given the nature of the moonlighting eﬀect, the larger the amount of total capital,
t h em o r eb e n e ﬁt is obtained in shifting it to underground production (e.g. μ drops).
The left-hand panel in Figure 1 also displays the local dynamics: the stability arrows
show that there is a single stable arm which leads the ﬁrm toward the long run equilibrium.
The upper left side of the stable arm is characterized by a stock of capital lower than the
equilibrium and a shadow price of capital higher than the equilibrium level, such that the
rational ﬁrm increases the stock of capital (net investment is greater than capital depreci-
ation) until the shadow price reaches its equilibrium level, at the steady state. When the
capital stock dimension is lower than the optimal level, given Eq. 14, the regularity share,
μ, is higher than optimal (see also the right-hand panel in Figure 1); during the process of
capital accumulation, the ﬁrm also shifts capital into underground technology (i.e. μ drops).
This allocating process lasts until the marginal productivity is equal across sectors (formal
and informal sectors, see. Eq. 14). An analogous symmetric process applies when the
capital dimension is higher than the optimal level and the ﬁrm operates on the lower and
19As stated above, we have a non-linear system described in a three-dimensional space. In order to ﬁnd
the steady state characteristics we must calibrate and simulate the system.




























Figure 1: Points above the locus ˙ φ0 =0are characterized, for each level of K,b yaφ0 higher
than the equilibrium level; given the dynamic expressed in System 17 it implies a growth in
the shadow price of capital (arrows pointing up). Similarly, when considering points above
˙ K =0 , we register for each K a φ0 higher than the equilibrium level; given the investment
function, Eq. 13, and the dynamic expressed in System 17, it implies a growth of capital
stock (arrows pointing right).
right-hand side of the stable arm.20
4 The Firm’s Structure
In this section we discuss the role of the external eﬀect "internalized" by the simultaneous
implementation of regular and underground technology, σ,a n dt h es c a l ee ﬀect A.T h e
latter is related to the dimensional eﬀect of ﬁrms, whereas the former reﬂects, as stressed in
the model, a broad series of indirect beneﬁts, stemming from regular production, and not
available for ghost ﬁrms.
4.1 The Moonlighting Eﬀect
The new element in the technology that characterizes our ﬁr m si se x p l i c i ts p e c i ﬁcation of
the advantages of operating in the diﬀerent sectors (formal and informal). The moonlight-
ing eﬀect proposed in this paper shows how the evader and the regular entrepreneur are
20Of course, every path other than the saddle path taakes the ﬁrm far from the long run equilibrium to
areas in which the transversality condition (Eq. 6) no longer applies.
16"intertwined" and how great is the advantage of operating together through the economy
as a result of transparent support of regular activity for irregular production. This insight
follows directly from the model and, as stressed above, it is supported by empirical evi-
dence, emerging from several surveys, on the characteristics of ﬁrms that operate in the
underground sector.
Thus, unlike models which suggest that underground ﬁrms are less eﬃcient and less pro-
ductive than regular ﬁrms, the key assumption we support here is the existence of a diﬀerent
category of the shadow production. This ﬁrm is able to exploit proﬁtable opportunities
not available to ghost ﬁrms. In this section we perform a comparative dynamics analysis,
considering how diﬀerent values for the technological parameter σ aﬀect the structure of the
moonlighting ﬁrm, and the allocation of the total capital stock between the two technologies.
Intuitively, a larger value for σ implies that the moonlighting ﬁrm strongly beneﬁts from the
simultaneity of its two productions.
Increasing the Moonlighting Eﬀect
αA τ σ F rρ s a δ
0.14 10 0.40 1.00 .025 0.05 1.30 .30 .125
(0.5)
For instance, doubling the size of the moonlighting eﬀect from the benchmark value 0.5
(in brackets in the table) to 1 causes a considerable increase in the equilibrium level of the
capital stock as well as a strong reduction in the share of regularity; the new equilibrium
vector is:
(K∗ =2 0 .6855;φ∗
0 =2 .0696;μ∗ =0 .7857).
These ﬁgures account for a 33% increase in the size of the capital stock, and quite a
large increase in its irregular use, as μ is downsized by 10% compared to the benchmark
calibration (see Section 3.3.2).
Figure 2 presents the graphical analysis of this shock. The change in the “internal
externalities”, σ,i d e n t i ﬁes a new steady state at a higher level of both capital and its
shadow price.21 There is initial overshooting of the shadow price of capital, generating an
investment process, which lasts until the new long run equilibrium is reached. A larger value
of σ triggers an investment process as well as a sudden drop in the regular share of capital,
which persistently decreases until the stock of capital reaches its long run level. To better
appreciate the intuition, it is useful to reconsider Condition 1 (the restriction σ<1−a
a aims
21The parameter reﬂects the dimension of an external eﬀect internalized by the simultaneous implementa-
tion of regular and "hidden" technology.
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Figure 2: the rise in σ immediately rises the marginal productivity of capital in the under-
ground technology, so that the shadow price of capital rises, and the curve ˙ φ0 =0moves
upward; simultaneously, the ﬁrm reallocates capital into the underground production, and
the curve μ(K), in the right panel, moves downward.
to avoide the occurrence of increasing returns to scale). Without this assumption, there
would be no equilibrium, and the concavity of the objective function would be no longer
ensured. Even more interestingly, under increasing returns of scale due to the moonlighting
eﬀect, it is not worth continuing moonlighting, and the solution converges toward a ghost
ﬁrm, i.e. μ → 0, while dimension is no longer determinate.22
The marked eﬀect on ﬁrm structure arising from the diﬀerent size of the moonlighting
eﬀect suggests how important the latter may be in order to determine the impact of policies.
T h i st o p i cw i l lb ei n v e s t i g a t e di nSection 5.3.
4.2 The Scale of Regular Technology
Parameter A is the scale of production in regular technology, and it produces important
implications for the relationship between ﬁrm size and underground activity:
YR = A(KREG)
a ≡ A(μK)a
Changes in this technological parameter generates great diﬀerences with the baseline
22Graphically, the locus ˙ K =0would have the usual increasing shape, but we would also observe an
increasing locus ˙ φ0 =0situated above the ˙ K =0such that no equilibrium could be found.
18calibration, both in terms of optimal capital dimension and share of regularity. For instance,
using a unitary productive scale, and leaving all the other parameters unchanged, we obtain
a new long run equilibrium for optimal capital dimension and its allocation between the two
sectors:
(K∗ =2 .92;μ∗ =0 .28).
By contrast, a larger productive scale, say A =2 0 , generates the equilibrium:
(K∗ =3 4 .94;μ∗ =0 .94).
This result is essentially derived from Eq. 14, which guarantees the optimal allocation
of capital between the two productions.
These experiments suggest a strong and direct relationship between the scale of regular
production, which can be considered a proxy for the ﬁrm size, and the choice to operate
regularly. The literature is almost unanimous on the importance of ﬁrm size in aﬀecting the
propensity to operate in the underground economy. For instance, a recent survey (Di Nicola
and Santoro, 2000), based on tax audits on a representative sample of Italian companies,
points out the main characteristics of Italian ﬁrms which evade levied taxation. In particular,
tax evasion is more widespread among small ﬁrms and new ﬁrms, especially when located
in the south of Italy. Moreover, tax audits show that evasion is more common in ﬁrms with
a weak property structure.
5 Fiscal Policy Experiments
Although a large body of literature already exists on the nature and eﬀects of state aid, no
general agreement is achieved about its ﬁnal eﬀects on the economy. Moreover, as far as we
know, studies which deal with the eﬀect of ﬁscal aid policies upon underground production
are rare. This section presents two selected ﬁscal policy experiments, a tax reduction and a
rise in capital subsidies, to evaluate their impact on the long run equilibrium as well as on
the investment policy of the moonlighting ﬁrm.
5.1 Case # 1: Tax Advantages
There is widespread agreement concerning the depressing eﬀect on investment of taxation
(see Summers, 1981; Abel, 1982). However, here the tax policy provides useful insights for
the comparative analysis we carry out below, with subsidies to capital stock in the presence
of diﬀerent ﬁrms’ technology structures (A and σ).
19In this section, we consider how tax relief on business may aﬀect ﬁrm choice under
moonlighting technology. Therefore we start our analysis by considering the eﬀects of a cut
in the corporate tax rate, τ, which we use as a tax-favoured treatment to investment, from
the benchmark value 0.4 (in brackets in the table) to 0.2:
Reducing Corporate Tax Rate
αA τ F σr ρ saδ
0.14 10 0.20 0.50 .025 0.05 1.30 .30 .125
(0.40)
Cutting corporate taxation by 50% causes an increase in the long run level of capital
stock as well as the share of regularity: the new steady state equilibrium is given by the
equilibrium vector:
(K∗ =2 1 .6026;φ∗
0 =2 .0749;μ∗ =0 .9114).
The policy causes a 40% increase in capital stock, and a 3.4% increase in the size of
the regular use of capital. The tax reduction increases the net-of-tax marginal revenue of
capital. This occurs in more marked fashion in regular technology due to Condition 2.
Figure 3 presents the graphical analysis of this shock; the change in the taxation rate
identiﬁes a new steady state at higher level of both capital and its shadow price. There is
initial overshooting of the shadow price of capital, generating an investment process, which
lasts until the new long run equilibrium is reached.
It is then interesting to investigate the dynamics of the capital allocation, μ. The fall in
the taxation ratio, (1 − ρτs)/(1 − τ), due to the fall in the tax rate, alters the equilibrium
relationship between K and μ. The relationship expressed in Eq. 14 balances the marginal
productivity of capital in the two productions. Hence a variation in teh taxation ratio alters
the relative proﬁtability in the two productions.23 A tax cut, ceteris paribus, induces the
moonlighting ﬁrm to be more regular, experiencing initial overshooting in its regular size,
for each level of the total capital stock.
As long as the capital stock increases toward its steady state level, the ﬁrm will also
reduce the share of regularity, adjusting toward its consistent equilibrium level of μ.
23Given Condition 2 in the main text, a fall in the tax rate necessarily causes, in the steady state solution
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Figure 3: The new tax rate causes an upward shift, due to the increase in the marginal
revenue of capital, in the curve ˙ φ0 =0 ,w h i l et h e ˙ K =0is unchanged. In the right-hand
panel there is an upward translation of the curve μ(K) due to the fall in the taxation ratio.
Given the initial stock of total capital, the share of its regular use, μ, jumps on the new
μ(K) curve (the cross one), so that an initial overshooting occurs (see the dashed arrows).
5.2 Case # 2: Capital Subsidies
The empirical literature on the eﬀects of capital subsidies has produced contrasting evidence.
Roller et al. (2001) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of state aid, and ﬁnd that subsidies are the most
eﬀective tool, while tax reliefs are as eﬃcient as subsidies only for regional aid. Bergstrom
(1998) analyses the eﬀects on total factor productivity of public capital subsidies to ﬁrms in
Sweden between 1987 and 1993; the results suggest that while subsidization can inﬂuence
the growth of value added, it does not aﬀect either productivity or competitiveness. When
considering studies available for Italy, Cannari and Chiri (2001), using a macroeconomic
framework, ﬁnd no evidence for a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of investment subsidies either on
value added growth or on employment growth in the manufacturing sector. By contrast,
Pellegrini and Carlucci (2003), using a diﬀerent estimation strategy, ﬁnd a positive eﬀect
of capital subsidies on employment growth in the examined ﬁrms.24 However, dealing with
capital subsidies to ﬁrms also has important implications for underground activities and tax
24Of course, bureaucrats and politicians grant subsidies as representative of the ﬁrms or people living in
t h ea r e ao rw o r k i n gi nt h es e c t o r .A n y w a y ,a l s ow h e nh aving a positive impact on the economic aggregates,
the dynamic eﬀects of capital incentives must be accounted for, since they may distort the market structure
if they keep ineﬃcient ﬁrms aﬂoat while inducing the more eﬃcient ones to exit the market.
21evasion. In this case, we attempt to draw on insights from these circumstances using our
model and allowing for an increase in subsidies. The policy experiment we carry out with
the model is a change (a doubling up) in the size of ﬁscal allowances to capital accumulation,
moving from the benchmark value 0.14 (in brackets in the table) to 0.28:
Dispensing Capital Subsidies
αF Aτ σ r ρ s a δ
0.28 10 0.40 0.50 .025 0.05 1.30 .30 .125
(0.14)
Increasing the size of subsidies to capital accumulation pushes up the equilibrium level of
the capital stock up, as we would intuitively expect, but also generates a marginal reduction
in the share of regularity. The new equilibrium is given by the equilibrium vector:
(K∗ =1 7 .1079;φ∗
0 =1 .9069;μ∗ =0 .8796).
These ﬁgures represent a 10% increase in capital stock and a 0.2% reduction in the
regular use of capital. The increase in the incentive to capital accumulation reduces the
cost of capital, such that there is an immediate eﬀe c to ni n v e s t m e n t .I nt h el e f t - h a n dp a n e l
in Figure 4 the locus ˙ K =0moves downward, and the shadow price of capital jumps on
the new saddle path to a level higher than the new equilibrium, inducing a ﬂow of new
investment. The rise of capital stock alters the equilibrium marginal productivity (Eq. 14),
such that as long as net investment is positive, the ﬁrm also reallocates capital between
sectors. Since the TFP in the irregular technology is endogenous (σ>0), it is optimal to
reduce μ until the new equilibrium of capital is reached (right-hand panel in Figure 4).
The important point is that, contrary to the presumption that subsidies may also be
useful for pushing ﬁrms to operate "over ground", in the presence of moonlighting technology,
the incentives to improve capital stock are actually counterproductive in this sense, and
increase the informal economy overall. To provide some empirical macroeconomic evidence
to support our results, Figure 5 reports investment incentives (source: Ministero Attività
Produttive) and numbers of irregular workers (source: ISTAT) for each of the 20 Italian
regions. Casual inspection suggests that there is a positive correlation between the two
measures, which is particularly marked when considering irregular workers in the industrial
sector (the coeﬃcient of correlation is 0.88). In spite of the State aid grant to business over
the decades, the phenomenon of underground activity persists and has increased. Indeed






























Figure 4: rising subsidies to investment generates capital accumulation, but it also spoors
the allocation of capital into the underground production.
The most intuitive explanation of the positive correlation between the two indexes is
typically traced back to the common factor “underdevelopment”. Indeed the underground
economy and economic underdevelopment are often
analyzed together (Loayza, 1996; Johnson et al., 1997). The evidence shown by our model
may introduce an additional argument, that is an opportunistic attitude of ﬁrms operating in
areas with large ﬁscal beneﬁts and a large underground economy. The investment subsidy is a
non excludable public good that opens room for free-riding (tax evasion in this context). Here
Government is not capable, because of un-modelled monitoring costs, to distinguish between
regular and moonlighting ﬁrms. Firms therefore have an incentive to declare a suﬃciently
small amount of revenues as to be eligible for obtaining the subsidy, while investing relatively
more in the underground economy and pocketing the tax wedge. Technology matters for
determining the extent of the declared production.25
25The ﬁrst order conditions suggest that the critical parameters for capital allocation in underground
production are the size of the moonlighting eﬀect, σ; the scale of regular production, A; and the taxation
ratio (1−ρτs)/(1−τ). In particular, if we calibrate the TFP in regular technology, A,t oav a l u el o w e rt h a n
the benchmark, the marginal eﬀect of a rise in incentives on the irregular share of capital is sharper. For
instance, setting A=5, the fall in the regular use of capital is about 0.5%; for A=2 the fall is about 1%. A
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Figure 5: Undeground employment and capital subsidies in Italian regions, 1998.
5.3 Policy Implications
To discuss the implications of policy measures under underground economy, it is useful to
provide a qualitative and quantitative syntheses of the experiments reported in the previous
sections.
5.3.1 Output Eﬀects
Table 5 reports the qualitative eﬀects of the investigated policies on the steady state value
of total capital K∗ and its regular share μ∗. The table shows that a tax reduction and a
more generous subsidies policy have a positive impact on capital accumulation, whereas their
consequences on the underground capital share are conﬂicting. A tax reduction provides an
incentive to shift capital into the regular economy, whereas increasing government subsidies -
to raise investment- also encourages ﬁrms to engage in underground production. Moreover,
the smaller the scale of production, the greater is the eﬀect of encouraging underground
production.
Output eﬀects are presented in Table 6,w h e r et h ee ﬀects of a tax reduction and of an
increase in capital subsidy are investigated under three diﬀerent scenarios (or also diﬀerent
moonlighting ﬁrms).
In the ﬁrst simulation, Scenario 1, all the parameters are set at their benchmark cal-
24Table 5: Qualitative eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies on the long run equilibrium
Fiscal Policy K∗ μ∗
Tax Relief + +
Increase in Capital subsidies + -
Table 6: Quantitative eﬀects of ﬁscal policies on the long run equilibrium. Long run equiib-
rium without the policy is set at 100.
Fiscal Policy Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
A = 10;σ =0 .5 A = 10;σ =1 A =1 ;σ =0 .5
Tax Relief 110.7 109.6 103.6
Capital subsidies 102.9 103.2 103.7
Scenarios 1 and 2 assume two of the many possible values for the technological parameters σ and A.
Given the non-linearity of the relations involved, we tested (through numerical calibration) for the
monotone pattern of the relationship between total production and both σ and A,w h i c hi sc o n ﬁrmed.
ibration (see Section 3.3.2); by contrast, in the other two simulations the technological
parameters σ and A are modiﬁed.
In the third column of the Table, Scenario 2, the moonlighting eﬀect is set at 1 (double
that of Scenario 1), while in the last simulation (Scenario 3) the technological parameter A is
set at 1 (sharply reduced against the benchmark calibration). Scenario 2 could well account
for an economic environment with a higher opportunity for tax evasion. Notice that para-
meter σ can also be broadly considered a policy instrument, in the sense that the possibility
for the moonlighting ﬁrm to exploit the external eﬀect of the aggregate capital is supposed
to be a function of the institutional and social framework in which ﬁrms operate. Finally,
Scenario 3 could well represent small sized ﬁrms, which are among the main beneﬁciaries of
the horizontal State aid policy.
The output eﬀects conﬁrm the importance of these parameters in determining the eﬀec-
tiveness of the policies. Two issues deserve attention. First, both corporate tax reductions
and increases of capital subsidies exert a positive impact on total output, as a consequence
of the policy eﬀects already pointed out in Section 5. Second, the impact of the corporate
tax reduction decreases, shifting from the benchmark scenario to the other two, whereas the
impact on the total output of the larger amount of capital subsidies increases. This asym-
metric performance is referable to the diﬀerent qualitative eﬀect of each of the examined
policies on the share of regularity, μ, as summarized in Table 5.26
26The model allows us to consider also the eﬀects of change in enforcement on the size and allocation
of total capital, as well as the eﬀects on total output. As demonstrated in Chiarini and Marzano (2005),
improving the level of enforcement causes an increase in the equilibrium level of the share of regularity, but
also a reduction in capital stock and in total output.
25In order to explain the diﬀerent output eﬀects, one should keep in mind the qualitative
eﬀects of ﬁscal policies reported in Table 5, and to consider how total factor productivity
(TFP) works in moonlighting technology, through Eq. 1, reported below for the reader’s
convenience:
Y = YR + YU = A(μK)a +( 1− μ)aKa(1+σ).
The larger the moonlighting eﬀect, the higher is total factor productivity in underground
technology, whereas the lower the scale eﬀect, A, the lower is the TFP in the regular tech-
nology. Consequently, both Scenario 2 and 3 display a ﬁrm structure in which underground
technology is relatively more proﬁtable than in Scenario 1 (i.e. the benchmark calibration).
T a xc u tp o l i c ya n dﬁrm’s technology structure. Under Scenario 2, characterized by a
strong moonlight eﬀect σ, after a tax cut, the capital re-allocation toward formal production
(i.e. a relatively larger μ), would prove more costly compared to the benchmark calibration.
An analogous eﬀect operates under Scenario 3, characterized by a small ﬁrm’s scale A: after
a tax cut, the capital re-allocation toward the formal production (a larger μ)w o u l db e
relatively less proﬁtable than under Scenario 1. In these new technological structures, a tax
cut policy produces a more costly shift towards regular sector production.
These arguments clearly explain why a corporate tax cut, under diﬀerent advantages of
operating in underground activities, provides an increase in total welfare of 9.6% (Table 6,
Scenario 2) and 3.6% (Scenario 3) compared to a benchmark ﬁgure of 10.7% (Scenario 1). In
other words, when considering a tax reduction, output gains are increasingly lower moving
from Scenario 1 to Scenarios 2 and 3 since the expansion of regular production occurs under
more productive underground technology.
Capital subsidies policy and ﬁrm’s technology structure. This reasoning helps to
interpret the consequences of more generous capital subsidies under the three diﬀerent sce-
narios. In fact, given the nature of the TFP characterizing the moonlighting ﬁrm, an increase
in investment allowances leads to a fall (albeit small) in the share of regularity μ. This out-
come has been described in Section 5.2. The reduction in the share of capital allocated to
the regular sector, activates a reverse process compared to the previously examined policy.
After a rise in subsidies to moonlighting ﬁrm investment, the capital shift toward under-
ground technology is more proﬁtable both under Scenario 2 (σ high) and 3 (A small) than
the benchmark calibration (Scenario 1). Compared to the benchmark case, now output gains
are grater for larger moonlighting eﬀects and lower productive scales: as the ﬁrm adds capi-
tal to its underground production, with much more favourable externalities and scale eﬀects,
26this unit of capital becomes slightly more productive than under benchmark technology.
Doubling the size of the incentives to investment (from the benchmark 0.14 to 0.28)
induces a 2.9% increase of total welfare under the benchmark calibration compared to an
increase of 3.2% and 3.7% under, respectively, Scenarios 2 and 3.
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Further useful insights may be drawn from the analysis of the reaction function, which
expresses the long run values of total capital and its regular share as a function of the
various sizes of each single ﬁscal policy parameter. The right-hand panel in Figure 6 shows
the eﬀects of the variation in a single parameter (tax rate, and moonlighting eﬀect) on the
size of regular capital, (μ), while in the left-hand panel the reaction functions for total capital
stock are displayed.
































Figure 6: reaction to taxation (star); incentives (dash); moonlighting eﬀect (triangle). The
range of variation of each parameter is (0.1-0.9). The horizontal line represents the equi-
librium level of total capital (left panel) and its regular use (right panel) in the benchmark
calibration. Each reaction function crosses the horizontal line when the relevant ﬁscal policy
parameter reach its benchmark value.
Figure 6 shows that reaction functions are always monotone, but they are also non
linear. The ﬁgure highlights the deep impact of taxation (cross-line) both on the capital
stock and on the size of its irregular use; none of the other parameters have a quantitatively
27similar impact. Tax policy is the only measure able to generate a co-movement in the
two objective variables, total capital and regular share: starting from the baseline value of
taxation, 0.4, a fall in tax rate generates a capital as well as a regular share increase, and a
welfare gain.
Judging from Figure 6, we should also conclude that the ﬁscal authorities should be
very careful when planning policies to support investment, especially in areas where the
underground economy is sizeable. The ﬁgure shows that capital subsidies impact deeply on
capital accumulation, but they also produce an increase in the irregular use of capital. In
designing policy subsidies to the stock of capital, what should be taken into account is the
“nature” of the ﬁrm, and, in particular, whether in the sector, and also in the area where
the ﬁrm operates, a large part of output is unreported.
As incentives to investment in the presence of moonlighters always produce incentives to
go underground, it may be argued there is the risk that this policy proves, via underground
activities, to be a time-inconsistent policy. If government policies support moonlighting
ﬁrms, the latter will have less incentive to increase their reported capital, since doing so
could entail a reduction in the level of incentives they enjoy.27 Therefore, the government
would be forced to provide incentives to capital accumulation for longer than expected.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ei n v e s t i g a t e dt h ee ﬀects of two ﬁscal policies to support ﬁrms, which can
be broadly included among State aid policies, in a context characterized by hidden activity.
As we have seen, State aid accounts for a considerable share of GDP in EU countries;
moreover, among the diﬀerent instruments, a very large amount of aid is provided directly
through grants to small sized ﬁrms. Comparison of EU tax rates and state aid presented
in Section 2 reveals that countries with high corporate taxation, such as Germany, France
and Italy, also provide large amounts of total EU State aid. In particular, in these countries
high corporate rates are recorded along with high tax exemptions. Since tax burden has
always been considered one of the main causes of growth in underground activities, there
could be strong links between State aid policies, tax policy and the underground economy.
The innovation of the paper is twofold: ﬁrst, we represent a speciﬁc technological advan-
tage (the "internal externalities") of moonlighting ﬁrms over ghost ﬁrms. Second, we consider
the implication of this framework for assessing selected aid policies under tax evasion.
In this regard, we set out an optimal investment model in which a representative ﬁrm
maximizes the expected cash ﬂow, selecting the optimal combination of capital stock and its
27See, for instance, Tornell (1991) analysis for trade policies.
28allocation between regular and irregular technologies. The model provides several striking
policy implications.
First of all, the troubling aspects of capital subsidies. In the context of moonlighting
ﬁrms, which display a kind of technology that is certainly not purely theoretical, but is
strongly supported by empirical evidence, government’s incentives to capital stock prove an
incentive not only to capital accumulation but also to its underground use. This policy is
clearly counterproductive if a government aims also to reduce underground production and
tax evasion.
The second striking result concerns the troubling aspects of the technology of moon-
lighters. Although tax allowances and capital subsidies both cause a positive eﬀect on total
output, their eﬀectiveness is basically related to the “internal externalities” and to the size
of the beneﬁt recipients.
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337A p p e n d i x
Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamic System of Equation 17 admits a unique steady
state.






(1 − τ)aA[μ∗ (K)]
a Ka−1 +( 1− ρτs)[1− μ∗ (K)]
a a(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1¤





To show that the ﬁrst equation expresses φ0 as a monotone and decreasing function of
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(r+δ) > 0;χ =
(1−ρτs)a(1+σ)
r+δ > 0.
The expression derived from equation 14 in the main text:
μ∗(K)= CKd
1+CKd;d = aσ













2 < 0 ∀a<1
It implies that the ﬁrst term of
dφ0(K)
dK is always negative, such that we need to demonstrate
that the second one is negative too:
[a(1 + σ) − 1][1 − μ∗ (K)]
a Ka(1+σ)−2 − a[1 − μ∗ (K)]
a−1 Ka(1+σ)−1μ∗ (K)
0 < 0
Using again the deﬁnition of μ∗(K) as well as
dμ∗(K)
dK we get:


















Ka(1+σ)−2 − aKa(1+σ)−2 CdKd
[1+CKd]
a+1 < 0








[a(1 + σ) − 1] − a CdKd
[1+CKd] < 0
[a(1 + σ) − 1] − adμ < 0.
As μ is a majorant of this last expression, we consider the case μ =1to get:
σ<(a − 1)
2 /a < (1 − a)/a
This condition can be considered a suﬃcient condition to obtain the required monotony
of the relation ˙ φ0 =0 .
Second Step
The second equation expresses φ0 a monotone and increasing function of the stock of
capital K. Indeed,
dφ0
dK = b(b − 1)(δK)
b−2 > 0 for each b>1.
34Given that the codomain of the ﬁrst equation is (0;+∞) while the second equation has
codomain (1 − α;+∞), it follows that there exists a single value of K such that the two
equations simultaneously apply.
Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamic System of Equations 17 is always a saddle
path.
Proof. The ﬁrst step is to combine the last Equation of System 17 into the ﬁrst one: (
˙ φ0 =( r + δ)φ0 − (1 − τ)aA(μ∗)
a Ka−1 − (1 − ρτs)[1− μ∗]
a a(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1
˙ K = I (φ0) − δK
The Jacobian of this System of Equations, evaluated at the steady state is:
"
r + δ −∂2Π/∂2K
∂I/∂φ0 −δ
#
and it has a trace and a determinant given by:









a Ka−1 +( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ∗)aa(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1¤
/dK
Local stability, and in particular saddle path stability, requires that the trace should
be positive, while the determinant should be negative, when evaluated at the steady state.
Under our parametrization it implies that the condition ∂2Π/∂2K<0, which is the necessary
condition to get a concave objective function, is also a suﬃcient condition to get saddle path
stability. Given the demonstration of the ﬁrst step of Proposition 2, it follows that
∂2Π/∂2K<0.
This result implies that the Determinant of Jacobian matrix of linearized System 17 is
negative, and it underlines that the equilibrium is a saddle path.
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